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Defendants exalt form over substance, contrary
to the purpose of summary judgment. There remai n
substantial factual issues regarding the time
at which the causes of action, both in tort and
contract, accrued. Defendants have never shown
their entitlement to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
,
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"discovery11 rule on the statute of limitations
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WALTER P. LARSON, an individual, and LARSON FORD
SALES, INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
STEPHEN WADE, individually,
and STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE,
KIPP WADE, dba SBK, a general
partnership, and VALLEY FORD,
a Utah corporation,

Case No. 900535-CA

Defendants/Respondents.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
None of the cases cited by defendants-respondents
(hereinafter "Wades" or "defendants") support defendants
estoppel-by-pleading argument in the context of a motion to
dismiss.

Pleadings are to be liberally construed, particularly

in early proceedings such as this, where the defendants have not
even answered, and particularly with respect to the tort claims
of plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter "Larsons") as to which no
inconsistency can even be claimed.
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There remains no evidence

that the Stephen Wade, Inc. Plan of Reorganization breached the
oral contract on any date certain because neither the Plan nor
any of the post confirmation orders were ever placed in the
record.
The Notice of Order of Confirmation, which is in the Record,
vests the property of the estate in Valley Ford, Inc., "except as
otherwise provided in the Plan,11 which Plan is not disclosed.
Under bankruptcy law, a "confirmed11 plan is binding only if its
terms so provide, and then only to the extent provided.

Since

the terms are not provided here, summary judgment cannot be
sustained.

Submission of the Plan, at most, repudiated the oral

contract, although even this conclusion cannot be reached without
consideration of the terms of the Plan itself.
Even under the general "accrual" standard, the Larsons1
complaint is timely.

Because the Plan was not placed into the

Record, the only date on which the breach of contract claims can
be found to have accrued is June 24, 1983, within four years
prior to filing.

The assets were "intact" as of that date.

Larsons1 tort claims therefore accrued after that time.

The

Upon

remand, the Larsons should benefit from the discovery rule
because the assets were "intact" when the Larsons were ordered
from the premises and the Larsons did not discover the torts
until more than one year later.
The Larsons intend to urge consideration by the panel of the
materials included in the Larsons1 motion to supplement the
record.
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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS EXALT FORM OVER SUBSTANCE, CONTRARY TO THE
PURPOSE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THERE REMAIN SUBSTANTIAL
FACTUAL ISSUES REGARDING THE TIME AT WHICH THE CAUSES OF
ACTION, BOTH IN TORT AND CONTRACT, ACCRUED. DEFENDANTS
HAVE NEVER SHOWN THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Neither the words in the second cause of action

(inter-

ference with business relations) that Stephen Wade, "having
breached his agreement with the plaintiff, conspired with and
induced...,11 nor the words in the third cause of action (breach
of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and conversion) that
defendants "did submit a contrary and adversary Plan to the
Plaintifffs plan ... which plan violated the contractual agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants" proves, as a matter of
law, that defendants breached their contract with plaintiffs (as
alleged in the first cause of action), more than four years prior
to the filing of plaintiffs1 complaint.

This language has

nothing whatsoever do to with the timeliness of plaintiffs1 tort
claims, as will be demonstrated below.

Neither should it bar

plaintiffs1 breach of contract claims, particularly where
defendants elected not to disclose to the court either the terms
of the Plan of Reorganization below or the post confirmation
orders dealing with the effective date of the Plan.
The Wades cite three cases to support the conclusion that
this language should bar plaintiffs1 breach of contract claims,
however, none of them even considers this estoppel-by-pleading
argument as early in the course of litigation as the pre-answer

3

motion to dismiss in the present case.
defendants were fully tried.

All three cases cited by

In Dailey v. Barnhardt, 768 P. 2d

907 (Okl. App., 1988), the case was fully tried, including a
pretrial order into which the pleadings were deemed merged.

In

Kula v. Karat, Inc., 91 Nev. 100, 531 P. 2d 1353 (1975), the case
was fully tried.

In Taylor v Pearl, 249 Or. 611, 439 P.

2d 7

(1968), the case appears to have been fully tried.
It is ironic that these defendants claim an estoppel from
the Larsons1 unverified complaint, when they have not even
answered its allegations.

The Wades should have been required to

answer before moving to dismiss on the basis of any statute of
limitations, as the Larsons initially argued.
Appellants,

Brief of

p. 15.

To sustain the dismissal of plaintiffs1 breach of contract
claims, this Court must be prepared to rule, as a matter of law
and solely on the basis of the Larsons1 unverified complaint,
that at no point in these proceedings would the Larsons be
entitled to prove that "breach" of the oral contract occurred
only when the Plan became effective.

To so hold would be wholly

inconsistent with the liberal pleading policy in effect in this
jurisdiction.

Consider Gill v^ Timm, 720 P. 2d 1352 (Utah,

1986):
"Rule 8(a) is to be liberally construed when
determining the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint....
if

....

"If there is any question about the sufficiency
of the complaint, it was removed when the trial
court, acting under Rule 15(b), allowed amendment
of the pleadings to conform to the evidence adduced
4

at trial.

This procedure is much preferred to

the alternative of dismiss!!

,f

720 P. 2d at 1353.

Even at trial, to maintain an estoppel-by-pleading objection
to the introduction of evidence, the objecting party must
convince the court "that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits."

Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Here there

can be no prejudice to the Wades whatsoever since the same
attorneys which defend them here also prepared the Plan.

The

simple fact is that they elected not to place the Plan into the
record, relying instead on the mystical concepts of "submission"
and "confirmation" to convince the lower court that the door
between the Wades and the Larsons had closed more than four years
before filing.

As will be shown below, the submission of the

plan was, at most, a repudiation of the oral contract which did
not start the running of the statute of limitations.
The defendants should not be permitted to so exalt form
over substance, or put another way, to so reduce this case to a
question of legal gamesmanship, particularly not this early in
the litigation, before any answer has even been filed.
In effect, the Wades have used summary judgment contrary to
its true intention, that being, to pierce the pleadings and
determine genuine triable issues. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver
Mining, 740 P. 2d 1304 (Utah, 1987).
This conclusion applies a fortiori to the allegations of the
Larsons1 complaint sounding in tort.

"Breached," and "violated"

as they appear in the complaint, do not even speak to the
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question of when the torts occurred, and there is nothing in the
record to even suggest when that may have been because the Wades
elected not to place either the Plan or the post confirmation
orders into the record.
All three of the torts alleged in the third cause of
action—breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and
conversion—involve wrongful transfers of Larson Ford Sales,
Inc. property:

(1) an $1,800,000.00 lease;

(2) a $200,000.00

parts inventory; and (3) $90,000.00 of furniture and equipment.
The Notice of Order of Confirmation, which is part of the Record
here (R. 34-36), provides:
n

2. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan or
the Confirmation Order, the confirmation of the Plan vests
all of the property of the estate in Valley Ford, Inc.11
[Emphasis supplied.] (R. 35).
On the basis of the Notice itself, it is impossible to
conclude, as a matter of law, the date on which any assets
"vested11 in Valley Ford, Inc. since the Notice itself expressly
refers the recipient of the Notice to the Plan for additional
information on that question.

In addition, the affidavit of

Walter Park Larson creates clear factual issues precluding
summary judgment on the tort claims.

It declares that the parts

"were intact on June 24, 1983," a date within four years prior to
filing of the Larsons1 complaint, and had "disappeared" only 18
months later.

1/

1/The Wades below relied exclusively on Utahfs four year statute
of limitations, Section 78-12-25, Utah Code. Here they
obliquely reference Utah's three year statute, Section 78-1226, Utah Code as well. This latter statute should not be
considered.
6

The defendants argue that "confirmation11 of the Plan is a
breach of the oral contract as a matter of law because under 11
U. S. C. Section 1129(c) the bankrupcty court
one plan."

f,

may confirm only

In reply, the Larsons cite 11 U. S. C. Section 1141,

captioned "Effect of Confirmation.11

11 U. S. C. Section 1141(a)

specifically provides that "the provisions of a confirmed plan
bind the debtor . . . [and] any entity acquiring property under
the plan. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, is it clear that

"confirmation11 is not an event of unvarying and universal import;
it is instead an event whose legal significance is dictated by
the terms of the plan itself. 2/

Since the terms of this Plan

were not presented below, the legal significance of "confirma-

2/That the legal effect of "confirmation" varies according to the
terms of the plan is buttressed by other provisions of 11 U. S.
C. Section 1141:
"(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan
or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation
of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in
the debtor.
"(c) Except j ^ ^ ajs otherwise provided in the plan or
in the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a
plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear
of all claims and interests of creditors...."
"(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in ^ ^ the plan,
or in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a
plan —
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose
before the date of such confirmation....
it

....

(B) terminates all rights and interests of equity
security holders and general partners provided for by
the plan." [Emphasis supplied.]
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tionlf cannot be decided here, particularly not as a matter of
law.
Under 11 U. S. C. Section 1141, it is clear that neither the
debtor nor the plan proponent are bound until "confirmation,11 and
then only if and to the extent that the plan so provides.

If the

plan so provides, there is, in effect, no binding plan until
contingent future events occur.

A plan with contingencies

therefore gives the plan proponent great flexibility, for if the
contingencies are not realized, the plan proponent is not bound.
Since the record below does not show the terms of the plan, the
proposition that the plan did anything as a matter of law, either
in contract or in tort, simply cannot be sustained.
It is not insignificant that the Notice of Order of
Confirmation of Plan (R. 34-36) parrots the language of 11 U. S.
C. Section 1141(a) with one telling exception.

11 U. S. C.

Section 1141(a) provides that "the provisions of a confirmed plan
bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities under the plan,
any entity acquiring property under the plan, and any creditor,
equity security holder" of the debtor [Emphasis supplied].

The

Notice of Order of Confirmation of this specific Plan parrots
this language, except for the deletion of "any entity acquiring
property under the plan."

It reads instead, "the provisions of

the Plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities under the
Plan and any creditor, or equity security holder of the
debtor.•••
The language in the Notice of Confirmation which describes
8

the rights of any entity acquiring property under the Plan has
been referred to above and is expressly contingent upon the
undisclosed terms of the Plan itself:
"2. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan
or the Confirmation Order, the confirmation of the Plan
vests all of the property of the estate in Valley Ford,
Inc. (R. 35). See Addendum 3, Exhibit A, p. 2, Brief of
Appellant.
The Larsons respectfully submit that the Court should read
this modification of 11 U. S. C. Section 1129(c) as set forth in
the Notice, as an admission by defendants that the Plan does
indeed "otherwise provide11 on the question of vesting of the
property of the Estate.

It is therefore impossible to say as a

matter of law this Plan either breaches the oral contract or
causes any transfer of assets sufficient to effect a tort on any
date certain. 3/
Since the Court cannot find, as a matter of law,
that "confirmation11 of the Plan was a breach of the oral
contract, it certainly cannot find, as a matter of law, that
3/0ther provisions of the Notice also noting exceptions to
confirmation based on the terms of the Plan are:
"3. The property dealt with by the Plan is free
and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and interests
of creditors and of equity holders in the debtor, except
as otherwise provided in the Plan or in the Confirmation Order.
"4. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan,
or in the Confirmation Order, the confirmation discharges
the debtor, the proponent of the Plan, SBK, and Valley
Ford, Inc. from any debt that arose before the
Confirmation Order was entered . . . ." (R 35). See
Addendum 3, Exhibit A, p 2, Brief of Appellants.
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"submission" of the Plan was a breach of the oral contract.

The

plan proponent, Stephen Wade, Inc., is not even a party to this
litigation, and as already shown, no plan has any binding effect
until confirmed and then only if and to the extent that the terms
of the plan so provide, which terms are not disclosed.
While it is true that there can be only one confirmed plan,
11 U. S. C. Section 1129(c), there is no prohibition against the
submission of multiple, alternative plans.

There is, therefore

no basis for the conclusion that submission of this plan
"breached" the oral contract.
"Breach" is a "failure to perform...."
445, 17 Am Jur 2d 903.

Contracts, Section

"Repudiation," on the other hand, is a

"renunciation" of performance "before the time for performance,
which amounts to a refusal to perform...." Contracts, Section
449, 17 Am Jur 2d 912.

Since there is no law against the

submission of alternative, multiple plans, it is impossible to
conclude, as a matter of law, that submission of this Plan did
anything more than repudiate the oral contract.

It is, in fact,

impossible to conclude, as a matter of law, that this Plan even
repudiated the oral contract without consideration of its terms.
The law of limitations as applied to repudiation is clear:
"[Wjhere an action is brought after the time fixed by an
executory contract for the beginning of performance by a party
who has committed an anticipatory breach, the period of
limitations runs, not from the time of such breach, but from the
time fixed by the contract for performance by the defaulting
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party,

Limiation of Actions, Section 132, 51 Am Jur 2d 701.

Since there is no evidence of (1) the time for performance; (2)
what a reasonable time for performance would be; or (3) whether
this plan even repudiated performance or was instead so
contingent that it could be deemed neither a breach nor a
repudiation, the questions of breach or repudiation at this or
that time, require further factual development through the course
of the litigation.
The judgment below should be reversed.
II.

ON REMAND, THE LARSONS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE "DISCOVERY"
RULE ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE. IN ANY EVENT,
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED EVEN UNDER THE GENERAL RULE.
Even under the standard relied upon by defendants, that

being, that a cause of action does not accrue until

,,f

the

happening of the last event necessary to ... the cause of
action.' Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P. 2d 1254, 1257
(Utah, 1983)."

Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const., 744 P. 2d

1370 (Utah, 1987), summary judgment should not have been granted.
Since there is no proof of either the terms of the Plan or its
effective date, there is no proof of when the last event
necessary to any cause of action may have occurred.

Walter Park

Larson's statement that he did not know the Wades were not going
to honor their verbal contract until June 24, 1983 is
entirely consistent with a plan still contingent as of that date.
With respect to the tort claims, the affidavit of Walter Park
Larson shows that the torts alleged were continuing well after
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eviction on June 24, 1983, culminating with a parts sale 18
months later.

All of this precludes summary judgment.

Even though summary judgment should not have been granted
under the above standard, the Larsons submit that the discovery
rule should be held to apply here, particularly with respect to
the tort claims.

With respect to the breach of contract, Walter

Park Larson states that he did not know the Wades would not
perform on the contract until June 24, 1983 when ordered evicted.
This discovery would be consistent with a Plan still contingent
as of that date.

It is also entirely consistent with the Notice

of Order of Confirmation which in fact refers each recipient of
the Notice to the Plan itself on many specific questions relating
to the overall effectiveness of the Plan.

With respect to the

tort claims, Walter Park Larson states that he was ordered out on
June 24, 1983, that on that date the parts inventory was intact
and that he "only learned eighteen (18) months later when an
official sale took place that all but $5,000.00 (appraised) had
disappeared.ff

Giving this affidavit the reasonable inferences to

which it is entitled,

Spor v. Crested Butte, supra, the

conversion of the parts did not start until after eviction from
the dealership on June 24, 1983 and was not completed and
discovered until eighteen (18) months later.

Since the Larsons

were remobed from any contact or control over the parts, this
case is indeed one in which the discovery rule should be held to
apply,

cf. Vincent v^ Salt Lake County, 583 P. 2d 105 (Utah,

1978); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah, 1981).
12

III.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.
The Larsons1 motion to supplement the record has been

denied, but without prejudice to renewal of that motion before the
panel which hears this appeal.

The Larsons intend to renew

their motion to supplement before that panel, but, in fairness to
defendants, without further argument here.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded for discovery and trial.
DATED this i ^ ^ d a y of March, 1991.

L. Edward Robbins
Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Appellants
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